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ABSTRACT
Despite Europe’s mass investments in advanced border controls,
people keep arriving along the continent’s shores under
desperate circumstances. European attempts to ‘secure’ or
‘protect’ the borders have quite clearly failed, as politicians
themselves increasingly recognise – yet more of the same
response is again rolled out in response to the escalating ‘refugee
crisis’. Amid the deadlock, this article argues that we need to
grasp the mechanics and logics of the European ‘border security
model’ in order to open up for a change of course. Through
ethnographic examples from the Spanish-African borders, the
article shows how the striving for border security under a
prevailing emergency frame has generated absurd incentives,
negative path dependencies and devastating consequences. At
Europe’s frontiers, an industry of border controls has emerged,
involving European defence contractors, member state security
forces and their African counterparts, as well as a range of non-
security actors. Whenever another ‘border crisis’ occurs, this
industry grows again, feeding on its own apparent ‘failures’. This
vicious cycle may be broken, the article concludes, once policy-
makers start curtailing the economies of border security
underpinning it – yet the challenges are formidable as the
industry retrenches along with the political response to the drama
it has itself produced.
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The borders of Europe are increasingly presented to us in the media and our political
debate as the setting for a perpetual emergency: boats packed to the brim, crowds gather-
ing at fences, chaotic scenes outside corralled-off reception camps. Despite the efforts to
contain, control and ‘combat’ unauthorised movement in the past decades, the situation
has only been getting more acute. We urgently need a better understanding of why
current border policy and praxis has failed, as well as openings towards a potential alterna-
tive approach.
This article delineates some ethnographic ﬁndings and recommendations along these
lines. Building on my long-running anthropological research on irregular migration on
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the Spanish-African borders (Andersson 2014), as well as on the substantial interdisciplin-
ary literature on border controls, it will show why the ‘ﬁght against illegal migration’ (as it
is commonly known) is counterproductive and urgently in need of a shift.
In considering attempts to ‘combat’ mobility, this article deploys the concept of an
‘illegality industry’ as a useful tool for grasping the mechanics and economies of border
security. A large literature now exists on the negative human consequences of powerful
‘border regimes’ (e.g. Andreas and Snyder 2000; Bigo and Guild 2005). Many such
studies have focused on the repressive aspects of controls, for instance as regards the
deadly politics of the high seas (Albahari 2006; Basaran 2015); the perils of encampment
(Agier 2014); or the biopolitics of controls (De Genova and Peutz 2010; Fassin 2001).
While building on these important ﬁndings, this article will focus not on the repressive
but on the ‘productive’ aspects of border controls. Europe’s effort to ‘ﬁght migration’, it
will be argued, produces what it is supposedly meant to curtail – more distressing
forms of ‘illegal migration’, to use the problematic term still invoked in political and poli-
cing circles. With these dynamics in mind, the term illegality industry allows us to see not
just howmigration has been turned into a ﬁeld of proﬁts for many actors (see Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Sørensen 2013) but also how a (counter)productive system has developed and
congealed at the borders.1
The article will ﬁrst give a brief overview of the historical trend, followed by a note on
public funding devoted to border security. It then considers mechanisms of failure at the
borders, focusing on the ‘market in border security’ and its counterproductive effects,
before concluding with policy recommendations in light of these ﬁndings. Reducing the
negative incentives in the security market, I assert, will be a key task in replacing a counter-
productive framing of mobility-as-threat with an enabling and ‘normalising’ frame –
although, as will become clear, the retrenchment of a system of vested interests, combined
with the usage of border security as a short-term political tool, makes it ever harder to
envisage a shift of approach.
1. Overview: maritime migration in context
Historically speaking, Europe’s migration or refugee ‘crisis’ is a recent phenomenon with
its roots in the tightened migration regimes put in place around the time of the 1970s oil
crisis. Before this time, various forms of low-skilled labour mobility into Europe did exist,
whether via Germany’s ‘guestworker’ programme or via the migration pathways from
former colonies into Britain and France. These pathways – like the US bracero programme
of the same period – had their faults, yet did not produce a migration ‘crisis’ of any sort.
This was to change from the 1970s onwards, however, in a pattern repeated across the
western world. At this time, the USA saw political panics about ‘illegal aliens’ mount in
parallel with reduced legal pathways and tougher enforcement of the US-Mexico border-
line (Nevins 2001). This dynamic – similar to crackdowns in other economic spheres such
as drugs – was soon to be repeated in the European case.
In Europe, the tightened migration regimes of the 1970s did not immediately lead to the
rise of irregular land and sea migration. In fact, such migrations hardly existed in Europe
before the 1990s – the time when a border security model akin to the US one was starting
to be put in place. The reason for this shift towards border security was the Schengen
agreement on free movement, which (largely for political and symbolic reasons) came
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to entail the reinforcement of the external borders of the EU. At this time, northern Euro-
pean states put pressure on southern counterparts to shore up their migration regimes.
As they did so, for instance by introducing visa requirements for North Africans early
in the 1990s, migrant boats started appearing along their shores; legal pathways were
being replaced with irregular ones. New clandestine routes and more policing crackdowns
have since then grown in parallel – leading to an increasingly frequent series of migratory
‘emergencies’, including at the Italian island of Lampedusa in 2004; at Spain’s North
African enclaves (and EU/Schengen territories) of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005; on the
Spanish Canary Islands in 2006; at the Greek-Turkish land border in 2010; again on Lam-
pedusa during the 2011 ‘Arab spring’; and in the successive crises in the central Mediter-
ranean since then. Europe’s ‘migration crisis’, in short, is a recent and man-made
phenomenon – a basic observation that crucially entails the possibility of the trend
being reversed (Figure 1).
Figure 1.Map of irregular migration routes from West Africa towards Europe, based on the MTM i-map:
www.imap-migration.org
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One important aspect stands out when looking back at the ‘border crises’ prior to 2014:
they were vastly inﬂated in the public debate. In stark contrast with the wild estimates and
fear-inducing ﬁgures produced by many politicians and journalists, scholars have high-
lighted how migration by land and sea has long been small relative to other means of irre-
gular entry and residence (e.g. De Haas 2007). Until recently, such irregular arrivals
hovered around the 100,000 mark per year; by contrast, overall immigration into EU
member states stands at 3.4m a year, including 1.4m non-European and 1.2m intra-Euro-
pean migrants. Even among irregular migrants, the majority have long been visa over-
stayers, as the EU border agency, Frontex, itself points out.2 The relatively low numbers
of maritime arrivals has however not prevented governments from announcing ‘emergen-
cies’ for short-term domestic political reasons, a point that will be returned to below.
Today we face a very different situation, as about 1m people have arrived in 2015,
among whom well over 80% come from the world’s top 10 refugee-producing countries
(Figure 2).3 Yet even as numbers of maritime arrivals have sharply risen, these need to
be seen in the context of record global refugee ﬂows. Almost 60m people are forcibly dis-
placed today (internally or externally), with the vast majority (86%) of refugees now
hosted by developing nations.4 The surge of refugees and ‘survival migrants’ (Betts
2010) since 2014 is thus but a small slice of global displacement, and would have been
manageable for a Union of 500m inhabitants with all the most advanced resources at
its disposal – if the political will to implement a common approach had been in place.
The roots of the troubles again go back to the 1990s, as Schengen did not come to
involve common asylum or labour migration systems – producing a ‘halfway house’
between European integration and retained sovereign powers. As a substitute for a
joined-up systemic response, European leaders have instead largely opted for a ‘default’
border security model.
Funding for this model remains opaque thanks to the multiple pots involved, from
Interior Ministry funds to re-routed development aid, yet a few ﬁgures are worth
listing. Europe has spent at least €11bn on deportations since 2000, according to a
Figure 2. Irregular entries across the external land and sea borders.
Source: Frontex (2009–2014) and UNHCR (2015).
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recent cross-European journalistic investigation. Frontex has seen its budget grow swiftly
since its founding in 2004, from €19m in its ﬁrst full year of operations to €143m in 2015.
The EU allocated 60% of its total Home Affairs budget for 2007–2013, or €4bn, to the ‘soli-
darity and management of migratory ﬂows’, including €1.8bn speciﬁcally for the external
borders fund (EBF). These funds contrast with the smaller disbursals (€700m) on the
refugee fund (RF) – a gap between security and reception support that increases signiﬁ-
cantly in ‘frontline’ member states such as Spain, Bulgaria and Greece, with the latter
receiving €21m from RF and €207m from EBF over 2007–2013 (Amnesty International
2014). In the current 2014–2020 period, the €3.8bn Internal Security Fund has bolstered
the security-focused funding stream.5
Most border security spending takes place on member state level, however. Spain,
which has listed the ﬁght against irregular migration as one of its main security objectives,
has in recent years built new detention, reception and control centres while increasing its
border and migration forces from 10,239 ofﬁcers in 2003 to more than 16,000 by 2010.6
Member states have also developed costly systems and technologies to control and
monitor irregular migration, including advanced coastal radar systems such as the
Spanish Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior (SIVE) and fences at the Greek, Bulgar-
ian, Hungarian and Spanish borders. Despite recent protestations, the EU has long sup-
ported this border work ﬁnancially while increasingly adding European-wide security
initiatives, including the vastly ambitious European external border surveillance system
(EUROSUR) and new technologies developed by the defence industry under the €1.4bn
security theme of the EU’s seventh framework programme (FP-7). Beyond such invest-
ments are the tied ‘aid’ deals with African states, whether in the $5bn Italy-Libya ‘Friend-
ship Pact’ of 2008; the more subtle aid, trade and diplomatic concessions of the kind
developed between Spain and African states; or the expensive EU deal-making with
Turkey of late 2015.
To sum up, the closure of legal pathways into Europe, along with the border security
response, has strongly contributed to the development of irregular land and sea entry
routes in the past two and a half decades. While the migratory ‘ﬂow’ along these routes
has long been small in comparison with other entry methods, large sums have been
spent on manpower, technology and new systems to keep people out even before the
latest sharp increase amid the global refugee crisis.7 Yet the resulting initiatives have
clearly not worked. Fatalities have sharply risen to more than 3700 in 2015; smuggling net-
works keep growing stronger; and arrivals are swiftly increasing. In its disproportionality
and deleterious effects, Europe’s ‘ﬁght against illegal migration’ here seems to mirror the
global ‘war on drugs’, which is now widely perceived as a costly failure in ﬁnancial, human
and political terms (LSE IDEAS 2014). A different approach is needed – but for that we
ﬁrst needs to understand the mechanisms of apparent failure through which today’s coun-
terproductive investments in ‘border security’ keep being perpetuated.
2. Mechanisms of ‘failure’
This section will show how European efforts to ‘combat migration’ have generated coun-
terproductive dynamics in a downward spiral. Crucially, it will also account for some of
the reasons why a seemingly failed response keeps perpetuating itself despite evidence
showing that it does not ‘work’ in the way it is ‘advertised’ to electorates. The sections
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below in turn trace the framing of migration as an emergency in need of a security
response; the market in security enabled by this framing; and this market’s destructive
nature, especially when approached on a global level.
2.1 The security slippage
In April 2015, the UN Security Council president rebuked Europe over a plan for destroy-
ing smugglers’ boats by saying that the issue was ‘not about protecting Europe; it’s about
protecting the refugees’.8 This slippage is key to much punitive migration policy today.
Since the 1990s, migration has increasingly been treated as a ‘border security’ issue in
Europe, as seen in its most extreme form in the association between migration and terror-
ism. Yet in most cases, the security approach is more subtle, encompassing a range of
aspects which will be addressed brieﬂy below.
First, institutional arrangements have increasingly come to favour a security model.
Since the 1970s, low-skilled (irregular) migration has shifted from being a concern for
labour and industry ministries to become progressively ‘appropriated’ by European
interior ministries as their ﬁeld of action (Guild 2005). This trend was strengthened in
the 1990s, when migration became a ‘home affairs’ issue, congealing into what is now
DG HOME. This political and bureaucratic arrangement, in turn, has channelled speciﬁc
type of ‘solutions’ to the migration ‘problem’. Research has shown that, on Commission
level, while the diagnosis of the migration situation may often be quite complex (and
member states’ emergency frames resisted), the proposed interventions tend to be secur-
ity-oriented (Svantesson 2014). Through such institutional path dependency, Brussels and
member state priorities on (ﬁghting) migration have come to dovetail with one another.
Second and equally important, the emergency frame applied to maritime migration – a
‘spectacle’ (De Genova 2012) broadcast by the media and fanned by politicians – has
further paved the way for the security model.9 The emergency frame, in repeatedly pre-
senting the migratory situation as an ‘unprecedented crisis’, enables a two-faced reactive
response of ‘humanitarian’ action and more policing. Rescues are often thought of in
opposition to border security, yet the trend is towards an increasing integration of these
responses within a common emergency frame (Andersson 2014; Cuttitta 2014; Pallis-
ter-Wilkins 2015). In West Africa, to give one prominent example, humanitarianism
has served as a key legal, moral and political justiﬁcation for pre-emptive interceptions
of migrant boats by Spanish, African and Frontex vessels collaborating under Joint Oper-
ation HERA, rolled out in response to the Canaries ‘boat crisis’ in 2006 (Andersson 2014).
In North Africa, Spanish forces call their Moroccan or Algerian colleagues when they spot
a boat on their surveillance systems, so that these states’ authorities can proceed with ‘res-
cuing’ the passengers against their will. As one border guard explained to this author, you
have to ‘prevent [migrants] from leaving’ so as to avoid them putting themselves in danger
– with little evident regard for the legal obligation not to expel people into countries where
they may face harm (non-refoulement). Similar attempts have been made along Italy’s
coasts, although the outcome of the ‘Hirsi case’ in the European Court of Human
Rights, along with growing conﬂict in Libya, has complicated the picture there (Tondini
2012).
Third, risk discourse has provided a set of tools for the security model to develop in new
directions. Frontex – as the pivot in ‘integrated border management’ – has reinforced the
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security response (and, to some extent, the emergency frame) through its language and
practice of risk analysis.10 The agency deﬁnes risk as ‘a function of threat, vulnerability
and impact’, or put differently, ‘the likelihood of a threat occurring at the external
borders, given the measures in place at the borders and within the EU, which will
impact EU internal security and/or the security of the external borders’.11 In these deﬁ-
nitions, the border is seen as ‘vulnerable’, while the people crossing it are construed as
a threat. Through its large Risk Analysis Unit and its Europe-wide network for collating
data on border crossings (Frontex Risk Analysis Network), Frontex ‘exports’ risk thinking
to member state agencies, reinforcing the threat and security frames in operation on
national level, while contributing to the prioritisation of migration controls at the external
borders above other tasks.
Fourth, targeting smugglers as villains has reinforced this security trend by reinforcing
‘supply-side’ punitive policies rather than addressing demand, in a clear parallel to the
drug wars (LSE IDEAS 2014). Politicians are often keen on presenting crackdowns as
not targeting migrants, but rather as attacking what is often erroneously referred to as
‘trafﬁckers’,12 as has been the case with the EUNAVFOR MED military operation (later
renamed ‘EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia’) of 2015. In fact, given that smuggling
is a market driven by rampant demand, punitive measures only tend to drive business
further underground while new risks are transferred downwards, from provider to
client. Looking back at the past 25 years of controls, the trend towards higher risks is
clear. While sturdy wooden ﬁshing boats were piloted by North African migrants them-
selves in the 1990s, the mid-2000s saw collectively organised trips from West Africa
towards the faraway Canaries as well as small-scale smuggling outﬁts developing in
North Africa. Today ﬂimsy vessels, boats without proper captains and predatory smug-
gling networks are the rule rather than the exception. A captive markets has also devel-
oped, especially in Libya, where migrants may be warehoused and harmed or tortured
with impunity since smugglers know that authorities offer no protection to their
charges (Amnesty International 2015).
Fifth, the social and material arrangements at the border have helped perpetuate the
security response. One example of such retrenchment concerns the growth of security
infrastructure and technology (Andersson 2015): this includes control and coordination
centres managed by border agencies such as Frontex, the Spanish Civil Guard and the
Italian Guardia di Finanza; fence technology, which keeps being reinforced in response
to more drama at the borders; surveillance, satellite and communications systems such
as EUROSUR; and new facilities for migrant detention. All these measures reinforce the
emergency frame and its attendant security response; worse, as the next section will
show, they also help generate a counterproductive market in controls that feeds on its
own failures.
2.2. The market in border security
Once migration has been framed as an emergency in need of a security response, a distinct
system develops to ﬁll this frame. The past 25 years have seen the consolidation of such a
system or industry, involving actors such as European security forces and their African
counterparts; NGOs, humanitarian groups and international bodies such as the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM), often working closely with the security
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 7
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response; and multinational defence and outsourcing companies. With each new crisis,
this ‘border’ or ‘illegality industry’ grows further. Yet it is not the ‘solution’ to the situation
at the border; it is rather a fundamental part of the problem.
The various actors working at the borders are not passive recipients of political dictates,
but rather active participants in the ‘illegality industry’. Moreover, the efforts of ‘core’
security actors usually point to a predictable outcome – more investments in border secur-
ity. Research has shown how the border guard community and defence groups have
helped create a ‘demand’ for their solutions in Brussels and European capitals. One of
the clearest examples of this was the 2003 convening of a ‘Group of Personalities’ on secur-
ity, involving industry ﬁgures and high ofﬁcials, whose 2004 report added signiﬁcantly to
the momentum for more research funding for this sector (Bigo and Jeandesboz 2010). In
subsequent years the EU’s FP-7 funding stream came to include a security strand, as noted
above, thus bolstering the EU goal of ‘improving the competitiveness of the European
security industry’ via new technology in ﬁelds such as border control and sea surveil-
lance.13 Lobby efforts have continued since this time, with the defence sector participating
for instance in the development of EUROSUR, in contrast with the limited public or par-
liamentary scrutiny of this initiative (Hayes and Vermeulen 2012). In sum, border security
has become an opportunity both for a European defence sector in need of new market
niches and for security forces that need to justify their role in times of austerity and as
their traditional role is at risk of diminishing (Bigo 2001).
However, the resulting security initiatives do not ‘solve’ the problem at the borders.
Instead, more controls in one area generate a displacement effect towards riskier crossings.
As Spanish and Moroccan forces ‘closed’ the route into the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla
in 2005, in response to the ‘border crisis’ at the enclaves’ fences that year, a new pathway
opened up fromWest Africa towards the Canary Islands – leading to the 2006 ‘boat crisis’
in the archipelago. Worse, both these crises occurred in anticipation of imminent (and
much-publicised) border reinforcement, in a trend that resonates with the 2015 surge
in arrivals across the Mediterranean. As the Canaries entry point was eventually ‘closed’
through close collaboration with West African states, routes were gradually pushed
towards the Sahara desert.14 Similarly, once a new surveillance system such as Spain’s
SIVE started covering one slice of coastline, routes moved further out at sea, leading to
investment in more coastal radar stations, and more risky crossings in ﬂimsy vessels, as
the border agencies themselves recognise (see e.g. Guardia Civil 2008, 93). In the
eastern Mediterranean, a similar enforcement/displacement dynamic has pushed people
from the Greek-Turkish border towards the Bulgarian-Turkish border since 2010 and,
once fences covered both these land perimeters, towards the more dangerous sea route.
In short, attempts to cut the ‘risk’ of migration has led to larger risks for those embarking
– yet this very risk cycle allows for new security solutions to be proposed.
Individual border guards are aware of the contradictions within their mission.
‘Migration is something that will never stop’, one Civil Guard Comandante told me,
even as he showed me new surveillance technology that aimed to halt it. Many colleagues
agreed. In Ceuta, one mid-ranking civil guard said that the new EU-funded fencing erected
in 2005 was ‘useless’. ‘For someone who has travelled thousands of kilometres and suffered
in Morocco, it doesn’t dissuade’. On ground level, meanwhile, discontent was widespread,
with civil guards in Ceuta and Melilla complaining about their rough and legally precar-
ious task of expelling migrants across the fences. Such examples show how criticism, doubt
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or at the very least ambivalence is widespread – even among the very actors who have
gained institutionally from the border security model.
The rest of this section will focus on Euro-African policing collaboration, the area that
most clearly illustrate the vicious cycle of investments. As in the USA and Australia, the
EU and its member states have come to involve so-called ‘transit’ states extensively in
migration controls and ‘border management’. These ‘externalisation’ policies have
framed migration as a risk; transferred the attendant risks to third states; and in the
end generated further risk, feeding into more reinforcements.
The export of a border security approach has been under way since the 1990s. As Euro-
pean states such as Spain and Italy have enrolled neighbouring states in controls, irregular
migration from sub-Saharan Africa in particular has increasingly come to be framed as a
threat (and also as an asset in terms of these states’ relationship with Europe, as will be
seen below). This process has been supported by the EU, including via the European
Neighbourhood Policy/European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
(EMHRN 2010); the global approach to migration and mobility (GAMM, launched
after the 2005 Ceuta and Melilla ‘border crisis’), and the broader ‘external dimension’
of justice and home affairs of which GAMM is a part.15
In the case of Libya, which has long been an important migrant destination, Rome and
Tripoli jointly started framing it as a ‘transit country’ in the 2000s. A security response
followed, involving both EU and Italian funds (Rinelli 2016) as well as the above-men-
tioned ‘Friendship Pact’, which was purportedly about reparations for Italy’s colonisation
of Libya yet fundamentally focused on migration controls and industrial expansion,
including as regards border security technology.16 In Morocco, another key North
African ‘partner’, Spanish incentives for cooperation have been more subtle, including
in the spheres of aid, trade, ﬁshing rights and the diplomatic question of occupied
Western Sahara (Andersson 2014). The EU has reinforced this process, including
through its ‘action plans’ and ‘mobility partnerships’ with Morocco as well as Tunisia,
which include clauses on combatting ‘irregular migration’. The partnerships promise
some limited (and difﬁcult to realise) labour mobility for Moroccans and Tunisians as a
sweetener for more in-country controls, as well as for efforts to reach agreement on
these countries’ readmission of third-country nationals.17
In West Africa, Spain has been able to go further. Amid the 2006 ‘boat crisis’, Madrid
convinced governments to collaborate in controls and deportations by launching an ambi-
tious ‘Africa Plan’ for development while opening embassies across the region (Gabrielli
2011). As my ﬁeld research and reports funded by the Spanish ofﬁcial development
agency, Aecid, have shown, development aid has here helped smoothen the path for secur-
ity cooperation, and has even been used to fund new security measures outright (Anders-
son 2014). The ‘developmental’ framing around security collaboration has been bolstered
by the European Development Fund and facilitated by the Euro-African ‘Rabat process’
since 2006 (which has now been replicated via the ‘Khartoum process’ in the Horn of
Africa). Through a growing development–security nexus, international mobility has
come to be framed in terms of illegality and security in West Africa – a region character-
ised by high intra-regional mobility where such frames were previously close to non-
existent.
Further, the export of a security model has given more powerful ‘partner’ states a
perfect bargaining chip. In Libya, Gaddaﬁ used the threat of maritime migration to
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have the embargo lifted, and continued doing so up until the NATO air campaign of 2011.
The unrecognised Tripoli government has similarly threatened, as Gaddaﬁ did in 2010,
that Europe would ‘turn black’ unless more resources and political recognition was forth-
coming.18 In Morocco, the government has managed to extract substantial ‘geographical
rent’ (Natter 2013) from the country’s positioning on irregular migration routes in a more
subtle manner. In Spain, it is widely acknowledged among border professionals that ‘if
[migrants] pass, it’s because they [the Moroccan authorities] want them to pass’, as one
civil guard put it. By selectively ‘opening’ and ‘closing’ its borders, Rabat can maintain
pressure on Spain and the EU while assuring a politics of recognition of Morocco as a
key European partner. Further south, in Mauritania – a large labour importer – the
migratory ‘threat’ has also facilitated political recognition: the 2006 ‘boat crisis’ in the Can-
aries came right after a coup d’etat, forcing European leaders to engage with the new une-
lected regime. In Turkey, similar processes are seemingly at work: the beleaguered
government received substantial ﬁnancial and diplomatic concessions from the EU in
2015, and proceeded to win in the snap autumn polls. Having ‘exported’ our notion of
migration as a threat, neighbouring states may then use it strategically as what Greenhill
(2010) calls a ‘weapon of mass migration’ – with far-reaching political consequences.
In return for favours, African states have rolled out repressive controls that make life
increasingly difﬁcult for anyone suspected of being undocumented, generating distress-
induced (or ‘border-induced’: Lemberg-Pedersen 2012) displacement. Morocco is again
exemplary. Since its 1992 signing of a readmissions agreement with Spain for third-
country nationals, its security forces have collaborated closely with Spanish counterparts,
including in informal expulsions of sub-Saharan migrants attempting to enter Ceuta and
Melilla. By 2003, Rabat had criminalised irregular migration, and the policing response
was stepped up through arbitrary raids and informal mass expulsions to the closed
Algeria-Morocco border (HRW 2014). Tunisia and Algeria have also criminalised irregu-
lar migration and launched punitive policies, including in the Algerian case informal
expulsions deep into the Sahara desert. In Mauritania, close policing collaboration with
Spain since 2005 has seen West African labour migrants detained and deported as sus-
pected ‘illegals’, negatively affecting relations with neighbouring Senegal and Mali while
complicating the country’s tense domestic racial politics (Andersson 2014; Migreurop/
La Cimade 2010). Libya, ﬁnally, perfected its hostile policies in the late Gaddaﬁ years,
where prolonged and arbitrary detention became the norm, along with widespread
human rights abuses. Such ‘hostile environment’ tactics have had a double effect: ﬁrst, a
displacement of routes away from sites of more repression; second, a fundamental under-
mining of regional labour mobility options for migrants who ﬁt the irregular ‘proﬁle’,
including many sub-Saharan foreigners simply targeted because of their physical traits.
Subjected to arbitrary controls, many such migrants experience increased desperation,
which in turn contributes to the wish to leave, as many migrants arriving into southern
Europe attest in interview (including with this author; cf. Cherti and Grant 2013). This
trend is seen most clearly in Libya today, as the post-Gaddaﬁ chaos has reinforced the
legacy of treating migrants as fair game through arbitrary detentions, extortions and vio-
lence; more small-scale distress-induced displacement has similarly been in evidence
around Melilla since 2013, when dramatic fence-climbing attempts again became the
norm despite expensive fence reinforcements.
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Finally, closer social relations among border practitioners have cemented the negative
dynamics. Spain has here led the way, with the Civil Guard ‘hardwiring’ cooperation
through initiatives such as the partially EU-funded Seahorse satellite network,
managed from coordination centres in Spain and countries including Senegal, Maurita-
nia and Morocco (Andersson 2015). In West Africa, a gift economy has in addition been
developed with local security forces, involving the transfer of border policing tools as well
as extra pay for patrolling migration. Other organisations and states have run parallel
initiatives, with the IOM and the EU ﬁnancing new border posts and control machinery
in Mali and Mauritania (Andersson 2014; Frowd 2014). In Morocco, more well-
resourced, close border policing cooperation with Spain involves monthly joint patrols
and regular high-level meetings. The resultant strong security networks have cushioned
the authorities against some of the counterproductive effects of the emergency treatment
discussed above. However, even in West Africa – the supposed ‘success story’ in ﬁghting
migration owing to the weak bargaining position of poor partner states – security forces
only half-heartedly accepted European priorities, as this author saw during research;
moreover, a constant funding stream was necessary to keep local forces on good
terms and to ‘outbid smugglers’.
In North Africa, similar dynamics are at play on a larger scale, as states such as
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya have a much stronger bargaining position, while
the gains from participating in smuggling are higher (and increasing the more border con-
trols are put in place). This makes ‘policy transfer’ even more difﬁcult, as Italy has seen
since it launched its policing collaboration with Gaddaﬁ. Given this reality, the principal
effect of the border policing networks is to ‘lock in’ security praxis, generating path depen-
dency for more of the same measures. Put differently, even as controls keep failing, the
new social relationship established between European and African security forces miti-
gates against a change of approach.
Outsourced controls – by constituting a boon for collaborating states and a bargaining
chip vis-à-vis Europe; by undermining regional mobility even when ‘successful’; and by
creating security path dependency in bilateral cooperation – have become self-perpetuat-
ing. From the viewpoint of powerful ‘partners’ in Europe’s neighbourhood, there is simply
little incentive to let go of the asset that the migratory ‘threat’ constitutes. Meanwhile, for
sub-Saharan states, the rising stakes in migration controls are leading to higher demands –
as seen in the November 2015 Valletta summit, when governments reacted with scepti-
cism to the European ‘outsourcing’ drive and the launch of an ‘EU Emergency Trust
Fund for Africa’.
In sum, Europe’s ‘ﬁght against illegal migration’ has created a worrying mechanism
for controls to keep growing indeﬁnitely. As more surveillance, patrols and barriers
push migrants towards riskier entry methods, new measures keep being proposed to
deal with the new risks, including technological ones such as the expensive
EUROSUR system or social/policing ones such as more collaboration with third
states, as is now the case with Turkey, Niger and the Horn. In this way, the failure of
controls has created a market for ever more controls, in a self-perpetuating dynamic.
Yet the process is far from smooth: as seen above, conﬂict and ‘internal’ criticism con-
stantly risk undermining the border security model – a point that will be returned to in
the conclusion.
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2.3. The tragedy of the ‘global commons’
How can the ‘illegality industry’ keep growing, despite its obvious failures? One key
reason is its political usefulness: it dissipates blame and accountability across a multi-
tude of actors and over a large geographical area. It also allows politicians to show
short-term ‘toughness’ on migration to a domestic audience, as will be discussed in
the conclusion. Apparent ‘failure’ is not only a ‘success’ from a short-term European
political perspective, but also for participants in the ‘border security market’: European
security forces, which see their position and funding base reinforced; the outsourcing
and defence sectors, respectively providing new security-related services and techno-
logical ﬁxes; and neighbouring ‘partner’ states, which ﬁnd both internal and inter-
national uses for the threat-based treatment of migration. Given displacement effects
towards riskier routes, however, the outcome is not beneﬁcial to everyone: someone
needs to deal with the new risks that have been generated. We are here seeing a
not-in-my-backyard approach with negative effects on both regional and global
levels, even as certain states may be able to claim in the short run that they have effec-
tively ‘halted illegal migration’.
This is seen most starkly within Europe today. Despite talk of ‘solidarity’, there are few
incentives for EU member states to collaborate, given they may then be ‘stuck’ with the
problem – not least owing to the Dublin regulation, which stipulates that asylum
seekers have to apply in the ﬁrst state they enter. Greece and Hungary knew this as
they built border fences despite protestations from the Commission, and Italy knows it
as it has allowed refugees to continue northwards without ﬁngerprinting. However, irre-
gular routes are not just ‘regionalising’, leading to intra-European conﬂicts, but they are
also ‘globalising’ in a distressing parallel with the globalisation of the punitive border
security model itself.
Australia’s Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) has been praised by hardliners, despite
the dire human rights concerns and the fact that its draconian provisions are very hard to
replicate elsewhere.19 Yet even if taken as a ‘success’ on its own narrow numerical terms,
the nationalities that were arriving before OSB overlap with those arriving in Europe.
Some 3500 Afghans arrived in Australia in 2012–2013; after the launch of OSB in Septem-
ber 2013, overall ﬁgures dropped dramatically. Meanwhile, the number of Afghans at
Europe’s borders rose from about 9500 in 2013 to more than 22,000 in 2014. In
another example, Israel completed a fence along its border with Egypt in early 2013; at
the same time, draconian detention provisions were put in place. Until that time, about
1000 asylum seekers, mainly from Eritrea and Sudan, were reaching Israel every month.
Soon after, that ﬁgure was almost zero.20 Meanwhile, detections of Eritreans at the EU’s
external borders shot up, from 2604 in 2012 to 34,586 in 2014.21
The parallel globalisation of routes and security responses has led to what may be seen
as a ‘tragedy of the global commons’, in which the ‘protection’ of one’s own borders has
severe repercussions elsewhere. Yet the large chain of interactions – ranging in Europe’s
case from third states to EU border forces, Frontex and defence contractors – allows
most actors to escape accountability and responsibility. In fact, this is a major factor in
the illegality industry’s growth: the larger the number of sectors involved, the harder it
is to establish chains of control. As the problem can always be pushed elsewhere, there
are moreover few genuine incentives in place to solve it; and no ‘hot spot’ approach to
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identiﬁcation of arrivals (as now rolled out in Greece and Italy) will solve this without a
shift in the incentive structures for both states and border agencies.
Certain kinds of migration, in sum, have increasingly been framed as an emergency in
need of a security response. The result has been a proliferation of ever more dangerous
routes; stronger smuggling networks; and higher, not lower, numbers of people using
them. This ‘failure’ has in turn generated a set of self-reinforcing dynamics and perverse
incentives as actors with a stake in more controls keep proposing more of the same medi-
cine to solve our self-inﬂicted emergency. We need a very different approach: systemic
rather than hoc; global rather than national or narrowly regional; and based on rights
and opportunity rather than security, as the concluding recommendations will delineate,
with a speciﬁc focus on how to shift the destructive ground-level dynamics detailed in this
article.
3. Breaking the vicious cycle
In investigating the counterproductive workings of Europe’s ‘illegality industry’,
this article has put emphasis on the practical arrangements at the borders,
where many actors now have a stake in the current approach thanks to its appar-
ent ‘failure’. Put differently, the ‘illegality industry’ is productive: it constantly
reproduces its object of intervention in ever more distressing forms, which in
turn leads to its reinforcement. Before concluding with recommendations, we
must also account for another reason why the border security model persists:
short-term economic considerations.
Scholars have long identiﬁed a ‘policy gap’ on migration: that is, a draconian discourse
contrasting with a relative level of actual permissiveness, owing to the economic beneﬁts of
unprotected migrant labour (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). While this is especially
clear in the USA, in Europe a similar trend is in evidence, as seen for instance during
the Spanish economic boom, when boat arrivals in the Canary Islands were initially
sent straight into the mainland and set free with an expulsion order, after which they
joined the ranks of construction, agriculture and service workers in the country. Even
in crisis-hit Europe, there is still an important demand for low-skilled migrant labour:
and given the ageing population of large parts of the continent, the gulf between rhetoric
and reality on migration is set to grow deeper. In fact, given the relative smallness of
migration ﬂows by land and sea into Europe until recently, a major reason for punitive
controls against such arrivals is that they constitute an easy target for politicians keen
to show resolve in ‘curbing migration’, given these routes’ limited demographic – and
thus economic – impact.
Against this backdrop, the article concludes with a double set of recommen-
dations that take into account today’s shift towards much larger numbers, and the
dangers and political opportunities presented by this moment of ‘crisis’. Many of
the suggestions here have already been proposed elsewhere, and the following two
sections will mainly seek to highlight key ‘selling points’ in light of the ﬁndings
and constraints set out above. The main contribution, however, will stem from
the article’s ground-level focus: how openings towards an alternative, ‘global’
model for mobility may emerge through the contradictions and conﬂicts inherent
in the border security model itself.
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3.1. Short-term goals: a harm reduction approach
Before giving more ambitious recommendations, short-term suggestions need to be con-
sidered given the severe constraints in Europe’s migration politics. Here, I suggest, policy-
makers may learn from the debate around the ‘war on drugs’, where there is a growing
realisation of the additional risks created by a ‘supply-centric’ and punitive response
(LSE IDEAS 2014). As in the drug wars, a harm reduction approach would be a big
step in the right direction. This would involve an acknowledgement that migration
(both forced and voluntary) is a structural phenomenon that will not be remediated by
punitive border policies; and that we thus need to ﬁnd rational and risk-mitigating
measures to deal with it.
Lack of space precludes a longer discussion of harm reduction measures, but in brief
these may include training for border guards, building on positive trials;22 streamlined
sea rescues, curtailing negative incentives for private actors to assist while bolstering exist-
ing sea rescue provisions within the ambit of border surveillance;23 minimising the conﬂa-
tion of ‘humanitarian’ and coercive responses by putting border security initiatives through
a rigorous ‘do no harm’ test; ‘ﬁre-walling’ development funding, similarly subjecting it to
‘do no harm’ imperatives with the involvement of aid agencies and receiving states, creat-
ing (with EU support) reputational risk pressures on reluctant governments; and bilateral
cooperation models for ‘human security’ ends, for instance as regards sharing sea rescue
expertise and administrative procedures with neighbouring countries, rather than
simply exporting a security model.
More ambitiously, Frontex risk analysis should shift focus from taking borders and ter-
ritories as its ‘referent object’ in need of protection and instead focus on risk to people – a
difﬁcult change, given the agency’s mandate and DG HOME’s securitising interventions,
yet something that can be pushed by stakeholders such as the Frontex fundamental rights
consultative forum combined with critical voices in border policing, the European parlia-
ment and other DGs. Transparency and checks and balances on DG HOME and Frontex
matters is crucial in this regard, showing how taxpayer-provided resources are being put
towards counterproductive measures. Border security initiatives must be put through
proper audits and political scrutiny, while a full evaluation of EU-ﬁnanced security initiat-
ives should investigate their real costs (including maintenance, manpower and hidden
outlays), as well as their consequences and ‘side effects’.
The most important – and also the hardest – harm reduction measure is to (re)estab-
lish legal pathways, learning from historical experiences in both the migration and
refugee ﬁelds. Options such as humanitarian visas (already issuable under the Visa
Code), refugee resettlement, family reuniﬁcation, labour migration programmes (includ-
ing for refugees) and the lifting of carrier sanctions all need to be pursued at the highest
level. Instead of establishing which speciﬁc legal options to pursue for both refugees and
migrants, I will simply highlight ﬁve arguments for them here. First, legal pathways
undercut the smuggling business, which has grown stronger thanks to the lack of
alternatives. Second, the hope of a ‘way out’ will lead to more patience among
people stranded in limbo. Third, rather than increasing the chaos, legal pathways in
fact enable oversight, control and identiﬁcation – all of paramount interest to European
governments. Fourth, legal pathways are a key part of a solidarity approach towards
non-European host countries, whose cooperation is crucial for a shift in dynamics.
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And ﬁfth, safe entries may also create ‘exit options’: more border security has been a
key contributing factor to the growth of undocumented populations in the West,
thanks to the insurmountable obstacles to a potential future return. In sum, legal path-
ways – rather than feeding the ‘doomsday scenario’ of vastly increasing arrivals so often
invoked in European politics – do not only allow for more humane procedures and
incentives, but also contributes to re-establishing control, in contrast with the risk
and chaos-producing border security model.
All these points assume a capability and willingness to change in Brussels and some
level of cooperation among member state governments; however, all these actors have
so far only managed to cooperate fully in the security model. Amid this deadlock, frontline
workers and agencies may themselves become agents of change, since they as noted are
often the ﬁrst to criticise aspects of the current approach. Harm reduction may thus fruit-
fully start with small measures and day-to-day coalitions, in a ground-up approach that
may circumvent obstacles on larger political levels while opening up for a more ambitious
model.
3.2. Long-term goals: towards a global model for mobility
A fundamental contradiction characterises today’s ‘open’ economies: relatively free cross-
border movements of goods, capital and well-off citizens versus heavy restrictions on such
movements for those who need it the most (citizens of poor, repressive or conﬂict-torn
countries). This contradiction – combined with the continued demand for protection
and jobs as well as for labour power from, respectively, the ‘sender’ and ‘receiving’ ends
– makes irregular migration inevitable, quite regardless of border security measures. Put
differently, migration cannot be treated as a separate policy sphere, but rather needs to
be considered in relation to larger political and economic ﬁelds. Instead of persisting
with a short-term, supply-centric and security-focused tactic for controls of migration,
we thus need an overarching political strategy that takes into consideration the ‘globalised’
nature of human movement and wider socio-economic realities. Such a strategy will need
to be global and systemic rather than ad hoc and national or narrowly regional; pragma-
tically, it must focus on rights and opportunities rather than security and threat scenarios,
since the latter have proven counterproductive and abusive. Here I will brieﬂy focus on
how a global strategy may emerge through four steps.
First, EU institutions must counter the emergency frame around migration and borders.
Since migration is a nation-state concern under the Treaty, it has been excruciatingly hard
to develop European initiatives that may help ‘normalise’ migration politics. Yet the Com-
mission, the European parliament and the European Court of Justice can jointly help
temper emergency rhetoric. For instance, when the Italian government announced a
national emergency and kept Tunisian forcibly stranded on tiny Lampedusa in 2011 in
front of the European media, the Commission and parliament could have bolstered the
political case for ‘de-escalation’. Funding is a key tool in this regard: while assistance
does need to be provided to states experiencing large inﬂuxes, it should be aimed at tem-
pering the emergency frame and normalising the situation through ﬁnancing for creative,
small-scale reception models. The Court may also investigate cases of prolonged detention
or detention-like conditions that keep building tensions at borders. Further, based on
evaluations such as those discussed above, incentives must be put in place for harmful
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security technology to be de-prioritised or even dismantled, starting with the most evi-
dently counterproductive cases such as border fences. Even if the European parliament
or Commission cannot force through change, they are able to make authoritative interven-
tions in the public sphere via objective evaluations and attendant ‘name and shame’ tactics,
while EU funds can be used to create positive or negative incentives for change, for
instance by withdrawing support over non-cooperation.
Second, third-state cooperation on migration needs to be reformulated. Instead of
exporting a punitive and counterproductive security model, European actors should col-
laborate with neighbouring states to normalise migration. This is in the medium-term
interest of European states, as more favourable living circumstances will lead to less des-
peration and drama at the borders, while weakening the political usefulness of migration
as a bargaining chip. Just as European actors have put pressure on neighbouring states to
cooperate in policing through sticks and carrots (mobility partnerships, trade, aid, diplo-
macy), they can do the same to get the opposite effect. More important than pressure,
however, is responsibility-sharing via legal pathways, to create a new environment for
genuine cooperation.
Third, within Europe, genuine solidarity and ‘normalisation’ similarly needs to be built.
Rather than mandatory ‘burden-sharing’ quotas, genuine solidarity must involve three
aspects: legal pathways from third countries, mutual recognition of asylum decisions
and an end to Dublin rules that have triggered ‘beggar thy neighbour’ behaviour –
meaning, in the longer run, moves towards some kind of common asylum system. This
ambitious shift needs to highlight the beneﬁts of mutuality and the costs of ‘going it
alone’. The current lingo of ‘burden sharing’ must be replaced by more enabling language
– and incentives to match it. Labour market instruments can be used to draw on the skills
and ambitions of new arrivals, while EU funds can support vulnerable refugees as well as
poorer member states. In short, with common policies and planning it is possible to spread
positive opportunities across Europe rather than compress problems in borders areas.
Still, this shift is excruciatingly difﬁcult, and may in the end need a drastic move such as
redrawing Schengen itself. A somewhat less dramatic measure would be to move
migration out of DG HOME to another directorate-general, thus eroding interior minis-
tries’ ‘monopoly’ over the phenomenon. One option would be to move migration issues to
DG Employment (labour migration) and DG Justice (asylum); a better move would be to
create a new directorate-general for Mobility, which would support positive, evidence-
based policies for intra-European and non-European migration and asylum.
Fourth, a fully ‘global approach’ under a UN umbrella may be envisaged that strengthens
and extends refugee and ‘survival migration’ responsibility while also involving low-skilled
labour migration. The default ‘territorial’ focus in refugee hosting – ad hoc reception
depending on where people may set foot – needs to be replaced by a planned global
system. While the various options for ‘stretching’ or complementing the refugee regime
have been discussed elsewhere (Betts 2010), I will here simply insist on the importance
of a UN framework that encompasses migrations outside the UN refugee convention –
not least since the role of the (non-UN) IOM has often proven to be contributory to
the problem, participating as it does as ‘service provider’ in security-based responses.
Rather than go into policy detail, however, my main focus here will be on how a
ground-level perspective presents potential pathways for change.
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This article has shown how certain kinds of migration have come to be treated as a
threat or ‘risk’, and how an ever-larger set of actors have converged around this treatment:
that is, we are seeing a centripetal pull towards border security. However, this treatment has
itself generated novel risks and dispersed these ‘centrifugally’, away from the ‘core’ border
security actors. On a national scale, risk has been transferred from northern/western
nations towards southern/non-western ones; institutionally, it has shifted from (some)
security actors towards state agencies managing increasingly difﬁcult rescues and arrival
situations; and intra-institutionally, it has trickled downwards, away from headquarters
to frontline ofﬁcers dealing with the chaos (Figures 3 and 4).
While a security coalition or industry has thus been built around migration-as-risk, in
the process generating more risks, there is signiﬁcant potential for alternative international
coalitions - an enabling ‘mobility industry’ perhaps - among actors that are now unequally
dealing with the novel risks, ranging from frontline border professionals to aid organis-
ations, and from African governments and state agencies to local border communities.
Adapting the language of Ulrich Beck, a shift can through such actors be envisaged
from a security-based ‘risk community’ to a genuinely cosmopolitan one, learning from
advances in ﬁelds such as climate change (Beck et al. 2013).
Figure 3. The ‘illegality industry’: centripetal convergence around border security.
Figure 4. A ‘mobility coalition’ (rectangle) forged around the centrifugal dispersal of border security risk.
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The key task is to start with identifying the costs and risks generated by the security
model, and so build political momentum around the reduction of risks to the common
good. As in the ‘drug wars’ and the climate change debate, ‘side effects’, risks and ‘extern-
alities’ have to be incorporated into cost assessments. Until now, Europe’s illegality indus-
try (and its equivalents elsewhere) has succeeded in presenting its negative effects as
external to operations: that is, not as negative externalities but as risks associated with
‘migration itself’, seen as akin to a natural force (a ‘ﬂood’, ‘tide’ or ‘avalanche’). Electorates,
politicians, state agencies and other actors need to be convinced that the large costs –
ﬁnancial, human, social, political – outweigh the ‘gains’ produced by border security. In
this endeavour, relying on the very governments and EU institutions responsible for rein-
forcing the border security model is certainly not enough. Instead momentum will have to
come from other sectors, including – in addition to the risk-facing institutions above –UN
bodies; journalists, academics and activists; and crucially refugees and migrants them-
selves, who often have the sharpest analysis of the gains to be had from their misfortune.
This article’s key contention is that politicians have been looking in the wrong ‘place’
(the border) and at the wrong kind of measure (security) to ‘solve’ the migration ‘problem’.
Ample evidence shows that punitive border measures do not work; instead, the ‘mixed
migration’ ﬂows of today need to be dealt with through other means, including economic
instruments at home and more intelligent interventions abroad. At the risk of stating the
obvious, no signiﬁcant shifts on ‘distress migration’ will occur until signiﬁcant political
and diplomatic will is put into resolving the conﬂicts in Libya, Syria, Somalia and Afgha-
nistan, all among the major origin or departure nations for those arriving at Europe’s
borders; and no punitive policy will keep the poor from seeking a better life for their
families. The suggestions above are certainly no quick ﬁxes. Yet this should be acknowl-
edged and even welcomed in our public and policy debates: for the opposite – a search for
a quick and visible ‘solution’ at the borders – has proven to be no solution at all.
Notes
1. Such a ‘systems’ perspective may be seen as unhelpfully assuming coherence, thus giving more
power to state actors than is necessarily the case. However, as I hope will become clear, this is
not my intention. Rather, considering seemingly disparate actors and practices through a
joined-up ’industry’ frame allows for seeing novel patterns and linkages, as well as conﬂicts
and clashes, among the sectors working on irregular migration.
2. See Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_
migrant_population_statistics; and Frontex on overstayers, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-
and-routes/migratory-routes-map/.
3. I use UNHCR ﬁgures since Frontex double-counts arrivals across the Balkans. See http://data.
unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php
4. See http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/key-facts-and-ﬁgures.html.
5. EU funding from Commission and Frontex websites. For the journalistic investigation, see
http://www.themigrantsﬁles.com.
6. Spanish border police ﬁgures from MIR (2011).
7. Sidestepping important legal distinctions, this article consider ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ jointly
owing to the security approach applied jointly both these groups, as well as to increasing
empirical overlaps between them: cf. Betts (2010).
8. See http://migrantsatsea.org/2015/04/30/un-security-council-president-on-mediterranean-
migrant-crisis-its-not-about-protecting-europe-its-about-protecting-the-refugees/.
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9. A note on terminology: emergency frame draws on Calhoun’s (2008) conception of the ‘emer-
gency imaginary’, while security model has been chosen to put focus un praxis, in an attempt to
avoid the discursive associations of the term ‘securitisation’.
10. Pace authors such as Neal (2009), I contend that the formulation of migrants as a ‘threat’ indi-
cates that a ‘risk approach’ can no longer be separated from a ‘securitisation’ process, especially
once we focus on border praxis rather than discourse (cf. Svantesson 2014).
11. See Frontex Guidelines for Risk Analysis Units at https://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/
ﬁles/ﬁle/03/11/2014_-_1104/7._ciram_guidelines_2012_interactive_v6.pdf.
12. See the website of the United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime for the deﬁnition of trafﬁck-
ing, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafﬁcking/what-is-human-trafﬁcking.html.
13. Citation from EU FP-7 webpage, http://cordis.europa.eu/programme/rcn/861_en.html.
14. One important nuance: the sudden opening of the Canaries route involved ‘opportunistic’
departures that were not later replicated across the desert to the same extent, although
numbers have risen in 2013–2015 with the chaos in Libya.
15. See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/index_en.
htm.
16. See, for example, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/opinion/19lucht.html?_r=0.
17. Spain, which has legalised informal expulsions at Ceuta and Melilla, is resisting an EU-wide
deal.
18. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/7973649/Gaddaﬁ-
Europe-will-turn-black-unless-EU-pays-Libya-4bn-a-year.html.
19. Australia, like Spain in West Africa, has depended on poor and powerless neighbours for the
success of its draconian offshore policy – a solution simply not available in Europe’s
neighbourhood.
20. See report by the IRIN news service at http://www.irinnews.org/report/99095/horn-migrants-
risk-new-routes-to-reach-europe.
21. Figures from Australia’s Department of Immigration and Border Protection website and from
Frontex Annual Risk Analysis, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/
Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf.
22. See Open Society Foundations Europe: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/
ﬁles/proﬁling_20090511.pdf.
23. See analysis by Steven Peers at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/the-new-
commission-ﬁrst-thoughts-on.html.
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